


Maritime Security Measures for Non-SOLAS Vessels

Mr John Grubb



Deputy Director of Transport
Security and Civil Contingencies
Directorate

TRANSEC



PURPOSE AND CONTENT

- For context – consider the Threat
- To apprise delegates of the current situation in the UK
- UK/EU considerations
- What can be done about non-SOLAS vessels

What is the Threat?

- Just terrorism, what about piracy/smuggling?
- Non-SOLAS craft are largely unregulated parts of the maritime industry
- Numbers of such craft are difficult to establish
- Three principle threat scenarios:
 - The craft themselves being targets of attack
 - The craft being used to transport personnel and equipment (either terrorist owned or hijacked)
 - The craft itself being used a weapon, for example the USS Cole and MV Limburg

Non-SOLAS craft in the UK

- Large scale and diverse problem:
 - Over 7,000 fishing trawlers
 - Over 474,000 leisure craft (from jet skis to large motor/sail yachts) moored in the UK
 - Over 90,000 leisure owned by UK citizens abroad
 - Over 550 commercially operating non-SOLAS ships ranging in size from tugs to coastal tankers
 - Port Services craft, including bunkering and pilot vessels

Application of Conference Resolution 7 in the UK

- No specific security regulation for non-SOLAS craft, but a holistic approach taken for port security, including VTS, waterside CCTV coverage, access control, pass systems etc
- Scoping study on a proportionate security regime for small craft has commenced
- Operational guidance on interaction between SOLAS/non-SOLAS ships/port facilities, including pre-arrival and DoS procedures

Application of Conference Resolution 7 in Europe

- EC Regulation 725/2004 extends to Class A domestic operations by 1 July 2005
- EC Reg. 725/2004 extends to other domestic operations, after risk assessment by 1 July 2007 – tonnage threshold to stay at 500gt
- Any further action, e.g. application to leisure craft, should be co-ordinated in Europe.
- On the agenda for Experts Group during 2nd Quarter 2005

Possible Security Measures

- Mistake to develop one size fits all approach – any regime must be risk based and flexible
- Training and engendering a security culture is vital
- Improved collaboration and information sharing between Governments, although host state responsibility is required
- Registration and tracking may improve the security picture but must deliver tangible benefits and avoid information overload

TRANSEC

The Future

- More scoping work on identifying the areas of greatest risk and the type of threat faced
- Proposals - proportionate and sustainable
- Effective protective security allied with robust response capabilities
- Intelligence driven regime and interventions
- Closing loopholes in the SOLAS Convention and assisting non-signatories to SOLAS
- Resolving ISPS issues before extending the regulatory framework further

TRANSEC

CONCLUSION

- Complex and potentially emotive issue
- Subject worthy of further study by MSWG, including delivery mechanisms eg SOLAS amendments or MSC Circulars?
- Addressing non-SOLAS ships likely to have secondary benefits e.g. crime reduction
- Any new initiatives must concentrate on security and not be overly bureaucratic
- Action must be measured and lessons from the past must be absorbed

TRANSEC